Lecture 15: Pseudo-random Generators

PRG Construction

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- Today we shall introduce the concept of pseudorandom generators
- We shall construct one-bit extension pseudorandom generators from one-way permutations using Goldreich-Levin Hardcore predicate
- We shall construct arbitrary stretch pseudorandom generators from one-bit extension pseudorandom generators

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Definition (PRG)

Let $G: \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^{n+\ell}$ be a function that is efficient to evaluate. We say that G is a pseudorandom generator, if

- ② The distribution G(U_{{0,1}ⁿ}) "appears indistinguishable" from the distribution U_{{0,1}^{n+ℓ}} for computationally bounded adversaries.

Clarifications.

- Intuition of a PRG: We rely on a small amount of pure randomness to jumpstart a PRG that yields more (appears to be) random bits

Pseudorandom Generator: PRG

- Solution Note that if ℓ ≤ 0 then PRG is easy to construct. Note that in this case n + ℓ ≤ n. So, G(s) just outputs the first n + ℓ bits of the input seed s.
- The entire non-triviality is to construct G when l≥ 1. Suppose l = 1. Note that in the case G has 2ⁿ different possible inputs. So, G has at most 2ⁿ different possible outputs. The range {0,1}^{n+ℓ} has size 2ⁿ⁺¹. So, there are at least 2ⁿ⁺¹ - 2ⁿ = 2ⁿ elements in the range that have no pre-image under the mapping G. We can conclude that G(U_{{0,1}ⁿ}) assigns 0 probability to at least 2ⁿ entries in the range.
- Note that the distribution G(U_{{0,1}ⁿ}) is different from the distribution U_{{0,1}ⁿ⁺¹</sub>. A computationally unbounded adversary can distinguish G(U_{{0,1}ⁿ</sub>) from U_{{0,1}ⁿ⁺¹</sub>. However, for a computationally bounded adversary, the distribution G(U_{{0,1}ⁿ}) appears same as the distribution U_{{0,1}ⁿ⁺¹</sub>

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- In this class, we shall see a construction of PRG when $\ell = 1$ given a OWP f. In general, we know how to construct a PRG using a OWF. However, presenting that construction is beyond the scope of this course.
- Note that these PRG constructions work for ny OWF f. So, if some OWF f is broken in the future due to progress in mathematics or use of quantum computers, then we can simply replace the existing PRG constructions to use a different OWF g.

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Observation on Bijections

- Let $f \colon \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a bijection
- Suppose we sample $x \stackrel{\hspace{0.1em}\mathsf{\scriptscriptstyle\$}}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^n$
- For any $y \in \{0,1\}^n$, what is the probability that f(x) = y?
 - Note that there is a unique x' such that f(x') = y, because f is a bijection
 - f(x) = y if and only if x = x', i.e. the probability that f(x) = y is $1/2^n$.
- So, the distribution of f(x), where $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^n$, is a uniform distribution over $\{0,1\}^n$

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Goldreich-Levin Hardcore Predicate I

- We define the inner product of $r \in \{0,1\}^n$ and $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ as $\langle r, x \rangle = r_1 x_1 \oplus r_2 x_2 \oplus \cdots \oplus r_n x_n$
- We will state the Goldreich-Levin Hardcore Predicate without proof

Theorem (Goldrecih-Levin Hardcore Predicate)

If $f\{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ is a one-way function then the bit $b = \langle r, x \rangle$ cannot be predicted given (r, f(x)).

This proof is beyond the scope of this course. However, students are encouraged to study this celebrated result in the future.

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A note on "Predicting a bit"

- Note that it is trivial to correctly predict any bit with probability 1/2. (Guess a uniformly random bit z. The probability that z is identical to the hidden bit is 1/2)
- To <u>non-trivially</u> predict a hidden bit, the adversary has to correctly predict it with probability at least 1/2 + ε, where ε = 1/poly(n)

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One-bit Extension PRG I


- Recall: A pseudorandom generator (PRG) is a function
 G_{n,n+ℓ}: {0,1}ⁿ → {0,1}^{n+ℓ} such that, for x ← {0,1}ⁿ, the
 output G_{n,n+ℓ}(x) looks like a random (n + ℓ)-bit string.
- A one-bit extension PRG has $\ell = 1$
- Suppose f: {0,1}ⁿ → {0,1}ⁿ is a OWP (i.e., f is a OWF and it is a bijection)
- Note that the mapping $(r, x) \mapsto (r, f(x))$ is a bijection
- So, the output (r, f(x)) is a uniform distribution if $(r, x) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$
- Now, the output (r, f(x), (r, x)) looks like a random (2n+1)-bit string if f is a OWP (because of Goldreich-Levin Hardcore Predicate result)

One-bit Extension PRG II

• Consider the function $G_{2n,2n+1}$: $\{0,1\}^{2n} \to \{0,1\}^{2n+1}$ defined as follows

$$G_{2n,2n+1}(r,x) = (r,f(x),\langle r,x\rangle)$$


- This is a one-bit extension PRG if f is a OWP
- This construction will be pictorially represented as follows



Generating Long Pseudorandom Bit-Strings I

- In the previous step, we saw how to construct a one-bit extension PRG *G*
- Now, we use the previous step iteratively to construct arbitrarily long pseudorandom bit-strings
- The next slide, using the one-bit extension PRG, provides the intuition to construct $G_{2n,\ell}$: $\{0,1\}^{2n} \to \{0,1\}^{2n+\ell}$, for arbitrary $\ell = \text{poly}(n)$.
- The example shows only l = 5 but can be extended naturally to arbitrary l = poly(n)

Generating Long Pseudorandom Bit-Strings II



PRG Construction

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- This is a PRG that takes *n*-bit seed and outputs 2*n*-bit string
- $G_{n,2n}$ is a length-doubling PRG if $G_{n,2n}$: $\{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2n}$ and $G_{n,2n}$ is a PRG
- We can use the iterated construction in the previous slide to construct a length-doubling PRG from one-bit extension PRG

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• Design secret-key encryption schemes where the message is much longer than the secret key

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